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Abstract. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) repre-
sent standard means for sharing publicly known information security
vulnerabilities. One or more CVEs are grouped into the Common Weak-
ness Enumeration (CWE) classes for the purpose of understanding the
software or configuration flaws and potential impacts enabled by these
vulnerabilities and identifying means to detect or prevent exploitation.
As the CVE-to-CWE classification is mostly performed manually by do-
main experts, thousands of critical and new CVEs remain unclassified,
yet they are unpatchable. This significantly limits the utility of CVEs
and slows down proactive threat mitigation. This paper presents the
first automatic tool to classify CVEs to CWEs. ThreatZoom uses a novel
learning algorithm that employs an adaptive hierarchical neural network
which adjusts its weights based on text analytic scores and classifica-
tion errors. It automatically estimates the CWE classes corresponding
to a CVE instance using both statistical and semantic features extracted
from the description of a CVE.
This tool is rigorously tested by various datasets provided by MITRE and
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The accuracy of classifying
CVE instances to their correct CWE classes is 92% (fine-grain) and 94%
(coarse-grain) for NVD dataset, and 75% (fine-grain) and 90% (coarse-
grain) for MITRE dataset, despite the small corpus.
Keywords: Hierarchical neural network · CVE to CWE classification ·
Vulnerability analysis · Proactive cyber defense
1 Introduction
Cyber-attack actions allow malicious actors to violate the intended security poli-
cies by bypassing the protection mechanisms or manipulating the resources or
the system’s behaviors. Thus, the consequence of the attack is a behavior that
violates the intended security policies of the victim. Such action, if it is made
accessible to the attacker, is called weakness. Weaknesses are flaws, fault, bugs,
and errors occur in software’s architecture, design, code, or implementation that
can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. A vulnerability is defined as a set of one or
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more weaknesses within a specific product or protocol, which allows an attacker
to access the behaviors or resources to compromise.
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is a hierarchically-designed dic-
tionary of software weaknesses for the purpose of understanding software flaws,
their potential impacts, and identifying means to detect, fix, and prevent errors
[6]. CWEs are non-disjoint classes, and they are organized in a hierarchical (tree)
structure to reflect this relationship in which every non-root CWE node inherits
the whole characteristics of its parents. Therefore, a CWE in the higher level
represents a more general definition of weakness, and every lower-level node adds
more details to that CWE node of interest. Meanwhile, the Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exposures (CVE) reports are a list of publicly disclosed computer
security vulnerabilities where every report is assigned by an ID. CVEs are brief
and low-level descriptions, representing the standard means for sharing cyber-
security vulnerabilities within a particular product or system [5]. CVE IDs are
assigned to those vulnerabilities that satisfy three criteria: (1) system bugs and
its negative impact on security must be acknowledged by the vendor, or vul-
nerability report and security policy violation of the affected system must be
documented by the reporter, (2) bug can be fixed independently of any other
bugs, (3) bug must affect only one codebase and those impact more than one
system get separate IDs.
In general, CWE is a dictionary of software vulnerabilities addressing the un-
derlying error, while CVE is a set of known instances of vulnerability for specific
systems or products. CWEs mainly explain how (conditions and procedures) and
why (cause) a vulnerability can be exploited, and what (impact) are the conse-
quences. When the vulnerability is unpatchable, the classification of CVE into
CWE becomes extremely important since only CWEs can provide the means
to develop countermeasure techniques and understand the CVE implications.
In this paper, we present a novel approach that employs a hierarchical neural
network design to automatically estimate the CWE classes corresponding to a
CVE instance using both statistical and semantic features from the description
of CVEs.
1.1 Motivation Example
Given ’CVE-2004-0366: SQL injection vulnerability in the libpam-pgsql library be-
fore 0.5.2 allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL statements.’, the description
shares the attack action (execute arbitrary SQL statement) within a particular
object (libpam-pgsql library) and specifies the consequence (SQL injection). Al-
though this low-level and product-oriented definition demonstrates the exploita-
tion of SQL injection, it fails to adequately specify the characteristic of this
malicious behavior, which is necessary to address potential prevention and/or
detection methods. The complementary associated CWE (CWE-89: SQL Injec-
tion) 1 provides a high-level and beyond-the-product knowledge by answering
1 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html
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three key questions: (1) why the attack is exploited: the system does not or in-
correctly neutralized special elements, (2) how this is exploited: by modifying the
intended SQL command, and (3) what the possible consequences are: read or
modify application data, and bypass protection mechanism.
The above-mentioned case is a confirmatory example to show how a CWE
can paint a clear picture of the existing holes in the systems and reveals potential
factors that cause vulnerability exploitation. Obtaining these factors is closely
associated with the paradigm of pinpointing applicable mitigation or detection
methods. For example, we can apply an ”accept known good” input validation
strategy, i.e., using a set of legit inputs that strictly conform to specifications
and rejects the rest, to mitigate SQL injection. Besides, we can detect SQL
injection by performing an automated static analysis (e.g., bytecode or binary
weakness analysis), dynamic analysis (e.g., database or web service scanners),
or design review (e.g., formal methods). Fig. 1 shows the hierarchical repre-
Fig. 1: It depicts the hierarchical representation of the CWEs. The red boxes
show the CWE-89’s relatives in the higher levels. This hierarchy plays an im-
portant role in understanding the character of the weaknesses from different
levels.
sentation of the CWEs. Analyzing the path from the root all the way to any
node in the lower levels is indispensable since each node reveals different func-
tional directions to learn a weakness. For example, by tracking the path from
the root node, CWE-707, to CWE-89, we realize that the SQL injection (CWE-
89) is a result of an improper neutralization of special elements in data query
logic (CWE-943), where both weakness are associated with injection (CWE-74),
and the injection itself is the result of improper formation and neutralization
of a message within a product before it is read from an upstream component
or sent to a downstream component (CWE-707). Incorporating this thorough
knowledge graph helps to maintain countermeasures from different senses, even
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if the most fine-grain node is not available. For example, assume that only two
coarse-grain candidates in different levels of hierarchy, CWE-707, and CWE-74,
are available for CVE-2004-0366, while the most fine-grain weakness (CWE-89)
is not discovered yet. Although fine-grain SQL injection characteristics is not
exposed, investigating the coarse-grain candidates helps to find the common
consequences and impacts, and accordingly extract defense actions against im-
proper neutralization and injection (e.g., filtering control-plane syntax from all
input). This example explicitly highlights the significance of the existing hierar-
chical structure of CWEs and shows how useful it is in perceiving the defense
actions.
1.2 Related Works
AA great effort has been made initially by MITRE and NVD2 to manually clas-
sify some CVEs to one or more CWE classes. Considering the growing number
of CVEs and the high labor cost of manual classification, MITRE has classified
2553 CVEs (out of 116K) to 364 CWE classes (out of 719) [6]. On the other
hand, NVD has [1] attempted to increase the quantity of CVE classification by
mapping about 85,000 CVEs. Although MITRE has classified smaller number
of CVEs compared with NVD, it covers a higher number of CWEs, and per-
forms a more fine-grain classification in hierarchical fashion. In the meantime,
NVD classified more CVEs but it includes smaller number of CWEs, without
addressing the hierarchy. The further investigation about the characteristics of
each effort is discussed in section 3.1.
In the meantime, there have been several research efforts other than MITRE
and NVD to analyze CVEs to enhance the searching process and to perform CVE
categorization. Neuhaus et al. [10] proposed a semi-automatic method to analyze
the CVE descriptions using topic models to find prevalent vulnerability types
and new trends. The test result reports 28 topics in these entries using Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and assigned LDA topics to CWEs. This approach
shows very limited accuracy, depending on the CWE type.
Na et al. [9] proposed Na¨ıve Bayes classifier to categorize CVE entries into
the top ten most frequently used CWEs with the accuracy of 75.5%. However,
the accuracy of this limited classification significantly decreases as the number
of the considered CWEs increases (i.e., accuracy decreased from 99.8% to 75.5%
when the number of CWE classes increased from 2 to 10). In addition, this ap-
proach does not consider the hierarchical structure for CWEs, which significantly
limits its value. Another classifier was developed to estimate the vulnerabilities
in CVEs using the basis of previously identified ones by Rahman et al. [12]. This
approach uses the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) to
assign weights to text tokens form the feature vector and Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) to map CVEs to CWEs. However, they use only six CWE classes
and 427 CVE instances. In addition, their classifier does not follow the hierar-
chical structure for CWEs as well.
2 National Vulnerability Database
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1.3 Challenges
Our investigation has revealed there are three main challenges to solve the CVE-
to-CWE classification as follows:
First, CWEs are organized in a hierarchical (tree) structure, in which, a
CVE instance can be classified into one or more interdependent CWEs that
belong to the same path. In the meantime, a CWE class can be accessed from
more than one path in the CWE tree structure [6]. For instance, CWE-22 (Path
Traversal)3 can be reached from two different paths, started by either CWE-
435 (Improper Interaction Between Multiple Correctly-Behaving Entities) 4 or
CWE-664 (Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime) 5.
Second, there is a semantic gap in and between the language of CVEs and
CWEs that makes the feature extraction phase challenging. Thus, performing
an efficient semantic analysis is inevitable in order to identify the connection
between similar concepts used in the CVE and CWE context.
Third, a considerably small percentage (about 2%) but high-quality classifi-
cation (fine-grains in the CWE hierarchy) of CVEs are provided by MITRE. On
the other hand, NVD delivers a higher percentage of CVE classification (71%),
but it used a considerably lower portion of CWEs (about 32% of CWEs used
by MITRE). Hence, there should be a trade-off to process small and imbalanced
datasets and classify CVEs into the most fine-grain CWE along with exploring
the entire nodes in the path. In addition, the feature extraction, feature selec-
tion, and training process must be robust to handle the overfitting problem as
well.
1.4 Contribution
Our research aims at finding a solution for this challenging problem by offering
a novel automated system, so-called ThreatZoom, to estimate the CWE classes
corresponding to a CVE instance. ThreatZoom takes the CVE’s description as
input and assigns a list of CWE classes along with the path connecting the
roots of the tree to the lowest possible level class. This classification procedure
comprises three steps: preprocessing (section 2.1), feature extraction (section 2.2)
, and hierarchical decision-making process (section 2.3). The feature extraction
algorithm extracts the textual features from the name and the description of all
existing CWE classes and their associated CVEs. Leveraging synonym vector
coding and n-gram analysis, we extract both statistical and semantic features
and process them to create feature vectors. Each feature is assigned by a TF-IDF
score that reflects its importance in the feature space.
The main novelty of this framework is in how TF-IDF scores are incorporated
into the neural network design. TF-IDF scores are set to be the initial weights
of the neural network at each level such that, the weights of the neural network
3 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
4 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/435.html
5 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/664.html
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at one level is the sum of all TF-IDF scores found in its children CWE classes.
Then, the neural network framework is trained to adjust these scores to reduce
the classification error during backpropagation. This unique technique of using
TF-IDF scores within a neural network framework has three advantages: (1)
it allows the neural network to learn experts perspectives in classifying CVE
instances using his knowledge, and the provided descriptions about the CVE, (2)
helps in reducing the effect of having a small number of training samples, and (3)
increases the chances for the neural network to converge at the minimum point,
which is highly likely is close to the global one in this classification problem.
In summary, this work has four key contributions: (1) the development of the
first algorithm that automatically classifies CVEs to CWE classes, (2) a novel
design of a hierarchical neural network that is able to trace CWE classes to the
most fine-grain in the CWE hierarchical structure, (3) a new approach to ex-
tract semantic and statistical features from CVE descriptions and compute the
score that reflects the importance of a feature in describing the vulnerabilities
at each level in the CWE hierarchical structure, and (4) an adaptive learning
technique that incorporates the computed feature scores by TF-IDF in a neural
network framework to allow an automatic adjustment for feature scores to re-
duce classification errors. The algorithm is tested using CVE instances provided
by MITRE and NVD. The test results show high accuracy classification and
allow for heightening threat understanding of CVE instances to take practical
mitigation actions.
To the best of our knowledge, this presented solution is first to offer an au-
tomated fine-grain classification of CVE instances to their corresponding CWE
classes using a large number of CWE classes and following its hierarchical struc-
ture.
2 Methodology
This section describes the algorithm to estimate the CWE classes associated with
CVE instances. The algorithm takes as input a CVE instance, and produces a
set of plausible CWE classes that might be associated with the input CVE.
The algorithm consists of three steps namely preprocessing, feature extraction,
Fig. 2: It shows the three steps for the algorithm to generate a list of plausible
CWE classes corresponding to the input CVE instance.
and hierarchical neural network decision-making process (Fig. 2). The algorithm
extracts the text from the description of input CVE instance, and cleans it
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to generate a normalized version of it. This normalized text is processed to
extract n-gram features to characterize the statistical and semantic properties.
These features are passed to a trained hierarchical neural network framework
to estimate the CWE classes associated with the input CVE. In the following
subsections, we describe the details of each three steps in details.
2.1 Preprocessing
This step takes the text provided in the description field of a CVE instance
and turns it into a clean and normalized version. This preprocessing phase is
accomplished via a five-stage process:
I. Converting to lowercase: Convert every letter to its lowercase. This is
based on the assumption that each letter conveys the same meaning regardless
of its case or encoding.
II. Filtering the stop words: Remove words that do not convey valuable
information for the classification process. These words are defined in the stop-
word list provided by Stanford Natural Language Processing Toolkit (NLTK),
e.g., ”to”, ”the”, ”for”, ”in”.
III. Text cleaning: Remove punctuation and special characters that do
not convey valuable information (e.g., ”,”, ”!”, ”?”). Hyphens are kept though,
because they may convey information.
IV. Word stemming: Reduce each word to its root in order to identify
the relationships and commonalities across large text documents. All words are
stemmed using snowball stemming model provided by NLTK python library.
V. Synonym vector coding: Groups the synonym words in the context,
assigns a code word to represent each group, and replace all the synonym words
with the code word which represents that group of synonym words in the context.
MITRE provides a section for a portion of CWEs called ”Alternative Terms”
in which it provides the abbreviations or other commonly used advanced terms
for that particular weakness. For example, [XEE, XML entity expansion, Bil-
lion Laughs Attack, XML Bomb] is a word vector associated with CWE-776
(’XML Entity Expansion’). In addition, MITRE provides a ”CWE Glossary”6,
which contains more general terminology that is interchangeably used in CWE
descriptions to convey similar meanings. Each group of words is represented by
a code that is a word from the group, such that any other word in the group
will be replaced by this code if found in the text. For example, the word im-
proper shares the same meaning with insufficient and incorrect in cybersecurity
domain, therefore they belong to the same vector and represented by code in-
correct. This helps in reducing the variance within the documents in the same
category, and in increasing the distance between different categories.
By conducting this five-stage process, the text is clean and has a unified
terminology. This helps in reducing the feature space dimension as described in
the next section.
6 https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/glossary/
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Fig. 3: This shows the five CVE description preprocessing stages.
2.2 Feature Extraction
The input to this component is the preprocessed text and the output is word-
level n-grams feature vectors [11,4,3]. The feature extraction is carried out in
two stages as follows:
N-gram analysis: In this phase, the input text is analyzed to generate a list
of unique 1-gram, 2-gram, and 3-gram terms. The window size n in the n-gram
analysis is a hyperparameter and set experimentally. We tend to set this value to
1, 2, 3 to satisfy stability and to avoid overfitting. Longer n-grams dramatically
increase the number of terms, i.e., word combination, that are rarely found in
CVE instances and may cause over-fitting in the training process. The list of all
unique n-gram items, N, is the union of N1, N2, N3, i.e.:
N = {N1} ∪ {N2} ∪ {N3}
This list of unique n-gram terms may contain terms that are rarely found in
describing CVE instances or CWE classes. Hence, these terms are removed from
the list to generate the feature vector as described next.
Feature vector generation: This stage takes the list of unique n-gram terms
extracted in the first stage as input and generates a multi-hot representation
vector indicating the terms that are likely to be used in describing CVE instances
and CWE classes. This vector is referred to as a feature vector. The collection of
terms that are likely to be used in describing CVE instances and CWE classes
is referred to as a dictionary. This dictionary is generated by the terms found
in the descriptions of CVE instances and all CWE classes in the training set.
Let the dictionary, denoted by Dict, be the set of items in the dictionary. The
dictionary is empty at the beginning, i.e., Dict = {}. Then for each text, xi,
provided either in the description of a CVE instance or in the description of a
CWE class in the training set, the preprocessing step described in section (2.1)
is performed on it to generate a clean version of the text, xˆi. This clean version
is analyzed using the three n-gram levels, i.e., 1-gram, 2-gram, and 3-gram, to
generate the list of unique items Ni. This list is added to the dictionary, as
described in Eq. (1).
Dict = Dict ∪ Ni (1)
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Eq. (1) computes the union between Dict and Ni. After processing the text
in the training set, the dictionary Dict includes all unique items that have been
found in the context. Notice that any unique item appears only once in Dict.
The dictionary items are processed to filter out items with low frequencies
(following the power law rule), i.e., a low number of occurrences in the training
set. Let f(tk) be the number of occurrences for the dictionary item tk in the
entire training set. Then the dictionary items are filtered according to the Eq.
(2).
Dict = Dict \ {tk}&, f(tk) < th, ∀k ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , D − 1 (2)
The threshold th is the minimum number of occurrences threshold. Eq. (2)
indicates that an item tk is removed from the dictionary when its number of
occurrences in the entire training set is less than the minimum number of occur-
rences threshold. This threshold is a prespecified value for the algorithm (th = 3).
The removed items are assumed to be noise and not conveying any information
of interest [13,8,7].
The dictionary defines the feature space, and its size determines the size of
the feature vector. Let D denotes the number of items in this dictionary. Each
unique item in the dictionary is assigned a unique index in the feature vector.
The feature vector representing CVE instance xi is computed as in Eq. (3).
Fi[k] =
{
1 , tk ∈ Ni
0 , otherwise
, ∀k ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , D − 1 (3)
The Fi is the feature vector representing xi. tk is dictionary item associated
with index k. Ni is the list of unique items found in instance xi. Eq. (3) demon-
strates that the feature vector has a value of 1 at all indices corresponding to
the items found in Ni and a value of 0 at the other indices. Fig. 4 shows the
system design for generating feature vectors.
2.3 Hierarchical Decision-Making
Hierarchical decision-making is the third step in the CVE classification algo-
rithm. This step takes the feature vectors computed in the second step (Section
3.2) and estimates the CWE classes associated with the CVE instance of in-
terest. It follows a top-down approach by training a classifier per node in the
CWE tree. For each node, a decision is made using the classifier that either leads
down to a different classification node or to a leaf. This hierarchical architecture
allows each classifier to focus on learning two aspects of its children: learning
the details that distinguish between the classes of its children and learning the
common features between the classes forming each child. This helps to simplify
the design of the classifiers to reduce the computational cost, as well as improv-
ing the accuracy of the system by making each classifier to focus on its children
without getting confused with other nodes.
In the classification procedure, for each node, the neural network takes the
feature vector and predicts the label of the class that is associated with a CVE
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Fig. 4: This shows the system design for generating feature vectors. It simply
takes the n-gram feature set from each CVE description and represents (encodes)
it in the dictionary space. Given the n-gram feature set for sample xi, N(xi) =
{fi,1, fi,2, ..., fi,n} and the dictionary of features, Dictionary = {t0, t1, ..., tD−1},
for every tj ∈ N(xi), Fi[j] is 1, otherwise 0.
instance in the next level of the tree. In this case, the neural network starts to
classify CVEs to CWEs that exist at level 1. In the next level, the neural network
takes the predicted CWE classes in the previous level and takes their children
for the next level classification. The neural network at each node is unique and
independent from the other ones at other nodes [2].
According to the MITRE classification, CWE classes are not unique, which
means, a CVE may belong to more than one class. Therefore, the system will
miss a portion of the data if it only considers children of one selected node. In
the best-case scenario, it will reach the correct class in the path, but it is unable
to detect other related CWEs that may exist on the other paths since the path to
the desired class is not necessarily unique. The neural network employs a multi-
hot representation to label the instances to handle this multi-label problem. In
this case, every instance can be represented by more than one class in training,
and the neural network may output multiple predictions for each as well.
Each neural network consists of one hidden layer. The number of neurons in
the hidden layer equals to the number of the classes present at the level L in
the CWE tree. Each neuron is fully connected to the input feature vector with
no bias. The sigmoid function in every output neuron generates a probability
score. If this value is higher than an imposed threshold, it means the input
feature vector belongs to the class associated with that neuron. Fig. 5 shows the
structure of the used neural network.
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Fig. 5: This shows the hierarchical neural network design of ThreatZoom. The
weight of this network is initialized by the TF-IDF score of each entry feature
neuron and its corresponding class in the hidden layer. Every node in the hidden
layer generates a probability score using sigmoid function and the maximum
classes are assigned as the predicted classes for the input CVE. This process
continues until the leaf node is reached.
Let Oli be the output of the neuron at index i in hierarchy level l. Then the
output of this neuron before applying the Sigmoid function is computed in eq.
4.
Oli(xj) =
D−1∑
k=0
F [k].wlki (4)
where xj is the text corresponding to the input CVE instance j, and w
l
ki
is the weight connecting the dictionary element at index k with the neuron at
index i at level l.
The set of classes with the highest outputs at all levels is the list of candidate
CWE classes output by the algorithm.
Each neural network is trained independently from the other ones using
the back-propagation procedure. The training process starts by initializing each
weight with its corresponding TF-IDF value. Then the weights are iteratively
adjusted to reduce the classification error. Thus, the weights of irrelevant fea-
tures for the classification process keep reduced, while the weights for relevant
features get increased. The obtained weights at the end of the training process
are assumed to resemble the TF-IDF values that would be calculated if a large
enough of training set is available.
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The classifier used in this algorithm is a single-layer neural network. This
simple classifier has been employed for three main reasons: first, to reduce the
computational cost by reducing the number of variables that a neural network
needs to learn, second, to avoid the over-fitting problem especially when the size
of the training dataset is small, and third, to allow mimicking experts thinking
process when classifying CVE to CWE according to the terms mentioned in its
description and their knowledge about the CWE classes. Some terms may have
higher weights than others in the decision process. This can be interpreted as
a score indicating the number of appearances a term occurs in the description
of a CWE class, or in the descriptions of the CVE instances classified to that
class, as well as, how often this term is used in other classes. This score can be
estimated using the TF-IDF technique. However, only taking the TF-IDF scores
into the account is error prone and is not the most effective way for two reasons:
(1) computing TF-IDF values accurately requires large datasets, and (2) it is not
clear what the terms that made experts do their classification are. These issues
are resolved by designing a neural network that reflects TF-IDF calculations
and allows it to train these values to find the ones that are important for the
classification process.
3 Results
The CVE-to-CWE classification algorithm is rigorously tested to quantitatively
evaluate its performance and compare it with other architectures. The quan-
titative evaluation is performed over MITRE and NVD datasets, where both
contains CVEs labeled by CWEs with a different manual approach. The evalua-
tion is performed by comparing the results from the proposed algorithm with the
CVE instances that have been manually associated with CWE classes by experts
in MITRE or NVD, established as the ground truth. We compute the evaluation
metrics including precision, recall, and F1 score to measure the performance of
the algorithm after comparing ThreatZoom’s results with the ground truth.
3.1 Dataset Specification
There are two datasets considered in the evaluation process: MITRE dataset and
NVD dataset. Each dataset consists of a group of CVE instances that have been
classified to one or more CWE classes. The classification process is performed
independently, so they may agree or disagree based on the different perspectives
of the experts. MITRE dataset comprises 2534 CVE instances that are classified
to 364 out of 719 CWE classes. It contains 1546 CVE instances such that, each
instance is assigned to one CWE class, while each instance in the remaining
CVE instances have been assigned to two or more different CWE classes. On the
other hand, NVD datasets contains more labeled CVEs compared with MITRE.
However, both data repositories have some major differences. Here, w dig more
deeply into the characteristic of both datasets:
ThreatZoom: CVE2CWE using Hierarchical Neural Network 13
1. NVD delivers coarse-grain classification, which provides more general cate-
gories for CVEs comparing with MITRE’s fine-grain classification.
2. NVD uses the top 116 out of 719 most common CWEs in their classification,
while this number for MITRE is 364.
3. Despite MITRE, NVD does not follow the CWE hierarchy in which each
CVE is classified to exactly one CWE ID.
4. NVD does not follow MITRE’s classification. Out of 2534 CVEs classified by
MITRE, NVD covers only 1092 of them in their classification. Considering
all the nodes in the full path MITRE classification for these 1092 CVEs,
NVD’s classification exists in this path only in 273 cases, (Fig. 6).
5. About 40% of the CVEs are classified to either Other or Categorical CWE.
Other represents an unknown CWE class, and Categorical CWE is a super-
class that covers multiple CWEs.
Fig. 6: MITRE and NVD classification comparison
3.2 Experiments
A comparative evaluation experiments have been conducted to evaluate the per-
formance of the CVE-to-CWE classification algorithm on the labeled CVE sets
provided by MITRE and NVD. The evaluation compares the estimated candi-
date list generated by the algorithm with the CWE class associated with the
CVE instance in two different levels namely coarse-grain and fine-grain which
are defined as follows:
– Coarse-grain: if ThreatZoom outputs one or a sequence of CWE classes
which are not necessarily full path toward the leaf, it is considered as coarse-
grain classification. In this scenario, ThreatZoom may not be able to suc-
cessfully offer the entire path to the leaf but it provides few candidates for
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a CVE among existing CWEs. Few candidates simply mean part of the full
path that is still very important to learn high-level information about the
vulnerability.
– Fine-grain: if ThreatZoom successfully predicts the full path to the leaf,
it is considered as fine-grain classification. Here the leaf means the original
labels the datasets.
The performance of the ThreatZoom is evaluated by three standard mea-
surements in both fine-grain and coarse-grain classification [14]:
- Accuracy : It computes the number of instances that are correctly classified,
divided by the total number of instances. For each input CVE, the neural net-
work offers one or more CWE candidates at each level. According to MITRE,
if the CVE label is included in the CWE candidates it is considered as correct
classification. This indicates that the algorithm provides a more detailed classi-
fication along the right path for classifying the CVE. This can be explained in
part by either the CWE sub-class was created by MITRE experts after this CVE
has been classified and they classified similar CVEs to this new CWE sub-class,
or there is a disagreement between experts, some consider it is acceptable to
stop classification, while others classified similar ones to the deeper levels.
- Error : It measures average number of incorrectly classified instances. In-
correct classification happens when the CVE’s label is not included in CWE
candidates generated by the neural network.
- Recall : Recall or True Positive Rate (TPR) addresses the average of correct
classification per class.
- Precision: It represents the TPR divided by the sum of the TPR and
False Rate Positive (FPR). FPR represents the rate of the instance mistakenly
classified.
- F-score: It measures the average weighted of TPR and precision.
Three experiments have been conducted to evaluate different aspects of the
proposed design. In the first experiment, ThreatZoom has been evaluated with-
out any modification. According to the results depicted in Table 1, ThreatZoom
successfully results 92% and 94% accuracy in fine-grain and coarse-grain classifi-
cation in the NVD set. In addition, it shows 75% and 90% classification accuracy
in MITRE dataset. Although there is 17% gap in accuracy of classification be-
tween NVD and MITRE, ThreatZoom shows it is able to learn short corpus and
imbalance data with a promising performance, and it can perform even better
if it receives more training examples from MITRE.
In the second experiment, the hierarchical neural network framework is re-
placed by a regular flat one such that the neural network considers all the classes
in a one-shot classification process regardless of their hierarchy and initialized
the weights randomly during the training process. In the third experiment, the
single-layer neural network classifier is replaced by a two-layer one, and the
neural network weights initialized randomly during the training process. These
experiments have been conducted using MITRE and NVD datasets. For the
MITRE dataset, 2131 CVEs are used for training, and 403 CVEs are used for
testing. For the NVD dataset, 50000 CVEs have been used in the experiment,
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Table 1: ThreatZoom fine-grain and coarse-grain classification performance over
MITRE and NVD datasets
MITRE (fine-grain, coarse
grain)
NVD (fine-grain, coarse
grain)
Accuracy 0.75, 0.90 0.92, 0.94
Error rate 0.25, 0.1 0.08, 0.06
Recall 0.73, 0.88 0.90, 0.90
Precision 0.75, 0.88 0.91, 0.93
F1-score 0.74, 0.88 0.89, 0.91
40000 CVEs for training, and 10000 CVEs for testing. In each test, the classi-
fication accuracy of the testing is evaluated. In the training process, the maxi-
mum number of allowed iterations is set to 500. Fig. 7 represents the accuracy
of ThreatZoom in all three experiments. The results show that the proposed
ThreatZoom approach outperforms all other approaches in classifying CVE in-
stances to their corresponding CWE classes. The proposed ThreatZoom scores
75% and 92% for MITRE and NVD, respectively. The one layer-flat framework
scores 18% and 29% for MITRE and NVD, respectively. The model with a
two-layer neural network classifier scores 8% and 32% for MITRE and NVD,
respectively.
Similarly, ThreatZoom shows a higher performance when it has a single-layer
neural network classifier, compared to the two-layer one. This can be explained
by the two layers neural network has a lot more weights to learn compared to
the single-layer one. This may cause an over-fitting problem when the size of
the training is relatively small compared to the number of weights. In this case,
the neural network learns the samples correctly in the training set while it is
unable to predict correctly unseen ones. The accuracy of the two-layer neural
network over the training set is 87% and 92% for MITRE and NVD, respectively,
while it is very low on the testing set, i.e., 8% and 32% for MITRE and NVD,
respectively. The accuracy of the two-layer neural network is high for NVD
compared to MITRE that is because it has a more extensive training set, but it
is still not enough to learn all the weights.
ThreatZoom performs better when it has a hierarchical neural network ar-
chitecture compared to the flat one. The flat neural network uses one classifier
to learn the general and the detailed features of all the CWE classes at once.
Learning general features deemphasize details to distinguish between dissimilar
classes, while learning detailed features deemphasize general features to differ-
entiate similar CWE classes, hence the confusion. On the other hand, in the
hierarchical framework, each classifier learns the features that distinguish the
CWE classes, which are children to its node in the hierarchical tree, only. Hence,
the high performance of the proposed ThreatZoom.
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Fig. 7: Comparing ThreatZoom with other models in fine-grain classification per-
formance
4 Discussion
In this section, we define different scenarios to point out the advantages and
practicability of ThreatZoom in dealing with a variety of challenges.
4.1 ThreatZoom and unlabeled CVEs
ThreatZoom is tested by unlabeled CVEs, and the results are evaluated by do-
main experts to analyze performance consistency. For example, CVE-2019-7632
represents ”LifeSize Team, Room, Passport, and Networker 220 devices allow
Authenticated Remote OS Command Injection, as demonstrated by shell meta-
characters in the support/mtusize.php mtu size parameter. The lifesize default
password for the cli account may sometimes be used for authentication”. The
proposed classification algorithm result for this CVE is the following sequence:
CWE-707 → CWE-74 → CWE-77 → CWE-78. Table 2 shows the ID and the
description of the CVE and classified CWEs. The key point in this vulnerability
is allowing Remote OS Command Injection. The Command Injection is a type
of attack which executes arbitrary commands on the host operating system via a
vulnerable application. Thus, the attacker-supplied operating system commands
that are usually executed with the privileges of the vulnerable application. Re-
garding this definition, from the high-level perspective, the Command Injection
can be exploited under no or improper enforcement of the password, which is the
lifesize default password in this CVE. Hence, the CWE-707 clearly reflects this
weakness of the system in this context. In the next level, the CWE-74 clearly
addresses the injection, which is the main action in this CVE. Command Injec-
tion and finally the OS Command Injection are the more specific definition of
the injection that are explained in CWE-77 and CWE-78.
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Table 2: Example of an unlabeled CVE (CVE-2019-7632) and neural network
classification result
ID Description
CVE-2019-7632 LifeSize Team, Room, Passport, and Networker 220 devices allow Authenticated
Remote OS Command Injection, as demonstrated by shell meta-characters in the
support/mtusize.php mtu size parameter. The lifesize default password for the cli
account may sometimes be used for authentication.
CWE-707: Improper Enforcement
of Message or Data Structure
The software does not enforce or incorrectly enforces that structured messages or
data are well-formed before being read from an upstream component or sent to a
downstream component.
CWE-74: Injection The software constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using
externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutral-
ize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed
or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.
CWE-77: Command Injection The software constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced
input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly
neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is
sent to a downstream component.
CWE-78: OS Command Injection The software constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced
input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly
neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when
it is sent to a downstream component.
4.2 More fine-grain classification by ThreatZoom
Reported results show not only ThreatZoom performs as good as the MITRE
and NVD engineers, who are well-trained for this task, but also it accumulates
their experience to offer even more fine-grain CWEs. Fig. 8 shows our approach
obtains more fine-grain classification for about 47% and 95% of those CVEs
that were correctly matched by MITRE and NVD, respectively. To validate
these results, we used our domain expertise to manually inspect 100 randomly
selected CVEs that received fine-grain classification by our tool. For example,
consider ”CVE-2001-1386: WFTPD 3.00 allows remote attackers to read ar-
bitrary files by uploading a (link) file that ends in a ’.lnk.’ extension, which
bypasses WFTPD’s check for a ”.lnk” extension”, where WFTPD is an FTP
server for Windows systems. The CVE implies that this server contains a direc-
tory traversal vulnerability, which may allow users to upload files with a name
extension ’.lnk’. ThreatZoom classifies this vulnerability to fine-grain class, which
is ”CWE-65 (Windows Hard Link): The software, when opening a file or
directory, does not sufficiently handle when the name is associated with a hard
link to a target that is outside of the intended control sphere. This could allow
an attacker to cause the software to operate on unauthorized files”. It clearly
addresses the windows-based software flaw that does not properly validate the
name of the uploaded file that causes unauthorized operation over the data.
This CWE is accurate and more specific than the MITRE classification which
is ”CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (’Link Fol-
lowing’)): The software attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it
does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that
resolves to an unintended resource”.
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Fig. 8: more fine-grain classification of ThreatZoom over MITRE and NVD clas-
sification
5 Conclusion and Future Work
There are continuous efforts by various organizations to provide a quality CVE-
to-CWE classification to enable a deep understanding of vulnerabilities and fa-
cilitate proactive threat defense. However, all existing efforts are mainly manual
and thereby do not cope with the rate of CVE generation. This paper presents
an automated technique for fine-grain classification of CVE instances to CWE
classes. To this end, we discuss the existing challenges and shortcomings and in-
troduce ThreatZoom as a novel blend of text mining techniques and neural net-
works in order to overcome problem. To the best of our knowledge, ThreatZoom
is the first automated system that addresses existing challenges and limitations of
classifying CVEs to CWEs. Our approach is rigorously evaluated using datasets
provided by MITRE and NVD. The accuracy of classifying CVE instances to
their correct CWE classes using the MITRE dataset is 75% and 90% for fine-
grain and coarse-grain classification, respectively, and 92% for NVD dataset. In
many cases, our approach obtains a more in-depth fine-grain classification for
36% for MITRE, and 62% for NVD, as verified by domain experts. This tool is
already being developed to leverage word embedding, and deep neural networks
to (1) better classify CVEs to CWEs following MITRE standards, (2) extract
threat actions out of CTI reports, (3) automatically calculate threat severity
scores, and (4) find the potential course of action mitigations and detection,
accordingly.
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